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COMRADES IN ARMS:
CHINA AND VIl~TNAM, 1949-1979
Krist.yn Allrcd
On Oclobl'r t, t ~H ~I Mao Zcdong and his
Communisl IIIITCS dcfealed Chiang Kaislwk and his
Nalionalist Anny to become tile ruling party in
China.
Many a Chincse peasant chanted the
popular song "The I'~asl is Red," which desCI'iLed the
success of Communism in the castcrn world. For
years Amedcans viewed China and its Communist
neighhors as a st.rongly unilied Clllnmunisl lJloc.
HowevCl", a deeper analysis of the relat.ionship
between China and other" Southeast Asian CIIunlries
iIIustrat.es thaI. ideological loyalty is not lhe only
ingredienl in a statc's '(,reign policy.
In facl, a study of the relalionship bet wccn China
and Vietnam during the years HH!I 10 t !l7~1 rcveals
a greal deal of hostility bclween the two cIHlIltl"ies.
One of lhe major reasons for this hostility may be
attl"ibuwd to in\.c."vcntion from Ihe two m<\jor
superpowers, the Uniled Slatl's and thc Soviet
Union. This paper will investigale I he n'ason why
Vietnam has lJeen China's most fonnidahle Il,e in
Southeast Asia sinn' I n1~l. I helievl' Ihal mUl'h of
I,he enmity helween the two counlries is due to
China ':; shift from the Soviet lJ nion 10 the U nitl'd
Sta\.es in lhel'arly I H70s, and \.0 Ihe alliance
formed belwel'n Vietnam and the Soviet llnion aller
tilt' Vietnam War"
M any of till' sl'holars who sl wly Sino- Vid n:lllll'se
relations havl~ cOllllTH'nll'd on Ihl' limitations Ihal.
exist in a""roal'hing this suhj\'\"1. It is mon' diflil"ult
\.0 gel ,.diabll' informal ion fmm COlllmunist China
than il is from a \' <1I·il'l.y of SOUIl'l'S in I he frec
world. 'I'hcn'fon', r:lll1('r than 10 n'lying Iwavily on
official govcl"nllll'nl sl alL'llll'nls (which may 01" may
not be true) or edilorial opinions in till' "People's
Daily," n~seal"dll'l"s havl' tl'm"l'd Chinesl' foreign
policy by ohserving how China has l'\'al'll'd 11\
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specific situations. The Ill'st way to analyze Chine~iC
foreign policy towards Vietnam is by examining
what each etluntry has done with respect to their
posture towanJs the superpowers.

lNTEHNAL CONF1JCTS
Bel"ore the argument is made concerning the
influence 01" the Unilcd Stat.es and t.he USSR 011
Chinese foreign policy, it. should he noted that, there
were several ot.her I"adm's which ('<lused t.ension in
Sino- Vietnamese I'elat.ions after 1!14!t.
Overseas
Chinesl' in Vietnam were a major SOlllTe 0(: cunnict
and tension.
The majorit.y 01" overseas Chinese
want(,d a relat.ionship with China that was pmfitaLle
and fri(~ndly Witzgcrald 1\177, :1:1\1). lIowever, these
((Ireign resident.s proved t.o be a nuisance 10 Loth
China and Vietnam as their capit.alist pradices upset
attempts at. a eent.rally eont roll('d governmcnt in
Vietnam.
Vietnam was said to hc overly harsh
wit.h its northern Vlslt.ors, thlls sparking heat.ed
dehatcs bl't.wccn t hc t.wo natiolls (itoss 1HHH, 240).
Another prohlem «II' Chilla alld Vietnam was
est.ablishing a common border.
While several
confrontat.ions werc reconJcd, t he most promincnt
disput.e OCCUlTed in 1!)7U when China actually
invaded Victnam (liarding IHH4, 12\).
Pcrhaps thc great.cst t.ension between China and
Vietnam result.ed from their power st.ruggle in
Southeast. Asia.
Both countries competed to gain
the upper hand in Indochina (Lawson I !)H4, 4).
Aft.el' the Vietnam war, bot.h China and Vietnam
I ,am;
sought
dominat.ion
in
and
Cambodia
( Kampuchea).
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between China and Vietnam, they were only
symphlms of a much great.er problem. I will argue
that outside influenco fmm t.he United Stat.es ami
the Soviet Union was the real problem bet.ween
China and Vict.nalll (I ,a wson I !1~H, (».
These
smaller issues were all arlirmation of t.he deep
seat.ed hostility that was already present due to
relations with the superpowers. Nations somelimes
ael as children when t hey are not geUing along;
they will use anything as an excuse t~l light.
Lean to One SiJe Policy
When the Communists tAlok over China in I H4B,
China turneJ to its most likely ally, the Soviet.
Union.
During Ihe early I !l50s China followed
Mao's "lean I~l one side" policy (Y ao HIHO, I). This
theory JireeleJ China's domestic and foreign
policies. Using Soviet lodlllology and funding, China
followed the Soviet model of industriali:wt.ion in its
first 5-year economic plan (liarding I UH:l, :n. In
foreign
relations with Southeast Asia, China
promoted
Communist
upnslllgs
and
anti-U.S.
campaigns (Martin I B77, H).
Chinese relations with Vietnam during this period
we.·e quit.e positive.
Both count.ries were aligned
against the Unit.ed Stat.es, who was then lighting in
Korea. China provided military and monetary aid
10 Vietnam in its light against the French (Ross
I !lHH, 18-1 H). They also shared the desire for Communist revolution in Vietnam (Lawson 1HH4, 20).
Perhap.s the most. important faelor which led to
favOl·able relations bet ween Lhe two countries was
the fact that China was so busy organizing a new
govt\nunent and managing the rl'COVt'ry of a
w.u·-hlrn nation that it had little time for Vit'lnam.
As long as n~gional powt'rs were gelling along,
V ietnam was in a good positioll to ask for aitl and
assistance from bot h China and the Soviet. Union.
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The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, anti
Mut.ual Assistance of I !HiO was <'it'arty in Vietnam's
Lest interest (II anJing I !)H·l, I HO-H,1).
The Spirit of Nt'ut ralit.y
These rosy relat.ions soon wilted in Imi4 with the
Geneva Conference.
Both China and the Soviet
Union supported the division of Vietnam, which
upset Ho Chi Minh and his Communist. rorces who
wanted a unified Communist nation (Wang 1B77,
75). In t.he wake of t.he Ul'neva talks, a conference
of Third World countries from Africa and Asia was
held in Bandung, Indonesia.
It was here, in the
face or anti-Chinese sentiments, that. Zhou "~nlai
presented China's policy of neut.rality and unity
among the lesser-developed nat ions (Chen t !nB,
15). North Vietnam was the only other Communist
count.ry present, but. seemed unimpress'ed wit.h
China's proposal for neutrality. 110 Chi Minh might
have relt that China was trying to be t.oo
independent of the Soviet Union (especially in its
foreign policy), which did not bode well for Viet.nam.
Ureat Leap

I·'orwanf

Relations began t~) deteriorat.e between China and
the Soviet. Union in 1~)57 wlwn Mao launclwd t.Iw
"Great. Leap Forward." Toward t.he end or t.he first
5-year plan, Mao Zedong was frustrat.ed by t.he
effeds of the Soviet Model on China. The very
t.hings he detest.ed were happening: unemployment.,
a lal'ge bureaucrm~y, a gl"l'alel' division between rural
and urban workers, and an elitist. educat.ion system
(Harding I ~)H4, fiO). The Un-at Leap was the first
wedge driven Letween China and the Soviet Unioll
because it emphasized Mao's rejection of Soviet
advice. The most. extrelTle Soviet reaction to t.hl'
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Ureat Leap took place in I !I5H, when Soviet
advisors pulled out of China (ilarding I !JH:l, :n.
Vielnam reuelet! negatively to China's Ureat Leap
Forward for two ,·easons.
First., Vietnam had
always looked to China as t.he model on many
domestic issues due to its size, culture, and
dominating political syst.em (Fit.zgerald I !I77, 50).
Vietnam had also ex perienced sOllie devastat.ing
economic problems during Lhe late I !H)()s, some of
which the Vietnamese blamed on China's bad example. The Great I,eap was a dh;aster for China
economically, which made Viet.nam leery of Chinese
policy and the direction it was taking (BloOllw(irLh
I !l75, I(H).
The second reaslln the <:reat Leap upset Vietnam
was because China had pullet! even furt.her away
from the Soviet Union. At t.he same t.ime Viet.nam
was criticizing China for the Ureat Leap Forward,
it was quite compliment.ary of Khruslwhev's policies
in the USSR.
As a n·sult., 110 Chi Minh tilted
tAlwards the Soviet 1I nion after the Sino-Soviet split
(Bloodworth I !I75, ""').
Lat.er we will sec how
Viet.nam cunningly shifled baek and f<IIth bet.ween
the Soviets and t.he Chinese during the war.
Viet.nam War
Probably the most. lTudal event which affeeled
China and Viet.nam in relation to t.he major
super'powers was t.he war in Vietnam.
In I H57
Communist f<II'ces frum North Vietnam began
aUacking South Vietnam. During t.he first year of
fight.ing China was
vcry sllpport.ive of the
Communist ,·evolut.ion in Vietnam. Mao had always
asserted the Marx ist. idea of l:IlIltinllous revolut.ion,
and wanted ComllHlnism t.o slIl:eeed in Sout.heast
Asia (Ii'itzgerald I !I 77 , Ii!).
lIowever, beeallse China was not. on good terms
with t.he USSR, Mao !"l'kl-ted Communist hlol' d1'orts
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to provide joint assistance 10 Vietnam (Harding
1!lH4, I ~ I).
China had addit ional motives for
sending mOlwy and w(~apons to Ihe Vietcong. China
wanted to protect its own horder, and 'gain favoi'
with the Vietnamese so that they would lean away
from the Soviet Union and toward the PHC (Martin
1!177, 4).
Nevertheless, by 1lI5H the Soviet llnion had
pushed itself into a Illore fa vorable position with
Vietnam hy supplying Vietnam with a substantial
amount of financial aid to fight the war (Hoss
1!lHH, 20). Mao was caught hetween a dual policy
of encouraging Communist insurgencies, while at the
same time claiming that foreign revolutions must be
fought by thei.· own people.
As a result,
ideologically China was hesitant about supporting
Vietnam (Yen 1976, 56). 1I0wever, the biggest
reason China did not compete with Soviet foreign aid
to Vietnam was a lack of resources.
Sino-Soviet Split
What had begun in the mid-llI5()s as a rejedion
of the Soviet model and a more independent China
was by 1H60 clearly a Sino-Soviet splil. Several
factors led to the falling-out between China and the
Soviet Union. As far back as 1!157 China and the
USSR had been quarrelling ovcr atomic warfare
(Uarver I!lH I, 2~).
Following the conflict. in
domestic policy with the Ureat I.eap, the Soviets
added sail to the wound hy refusing to support
Chi na in the Sino-Indian dispute (Ilarding 1lIH:', :l).
In spit.e of all t.hese prol,I('lI1s, it was eventually
the different interpretations of Marxism that dropped
an ideological axe between (:hina and the Soviet
lJnion. After Stalin died in I !I:):I, the Soviets nune
out wilh (i,ur hasic pl'llposals ill t.he 2Ulh Congress
of the COllllllunist Party or tilt' Soviet. lInion. First,
the lJSSlt prl'selllt~d a III~W I'ol'l'igll policy which
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relied on peaceful coex istence between all nations,
even those supporting capitalism.
Second, they
wanted to move towards socialism peacefully. Third,
Ktu'ushchev denounced the Stalin cull. And finally,
the Soviets encouraged self-criticism for all the
Communist nations (Smyser I HSO, (i).
China
reacted negatively to all '(Hlr proposals, and felt that
the Soviets had forsaken true Communism. In the
eyes of Mao, the Soviet Union had turned revisionist
and could no longer be trusted (Wang 1!l77, W:l).
It should be noted t hat for a brief mOllwnt. afler
the Sino-Soviet split, V ietnam had a wave of good
I(~elings for the Chinese (Smyser I HHO, (iO).
China
increased its military aid, and convinced Vietnam to
unite against the Communist revisionists who had
taken over in t.he Soviet Union. It was t.he fall of
Khrushchev in I ~Hi4 that. pushed Vietnam !Jack into
a neutral camp, from which it could receive aid
from both China and t.he Soviets more easily
(Smysel' IHRO, 7(i). As mentioned earlier, Vietnam
did a fairly good jo!J of maint.aining favorable
relations with both (he Soviet Union and t.he PRe
during the war.
It was not until aft.er the war
that. Vietnam swung decidedly t.owards t.he USSR.
U.S.

III

Vietnam

The war in Vietnam changed after the Gulf of
Tonkin incident.
The United St.ates had been
involved in t.he war during t.he early I !HiOs, but it
wasn't until I Hti4 when Nort.h Vietnam sank two
U.S. PT boat.s that. the United States drast.ically
escalated its war efforts. The United States was a
common enemy of t.hl' USSR, China, and Vietnam,
hut strangely enough those count ries did not ullite
against t.he lJ .S.
III fad, hy t.he end of the war
China had left. t.he side of Vietnam, and had become
somewhat of an ally with t.he LJnitl~d Stat.es.
One explanation of this phenomenoll is that China
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was great.ly influenced by tilt! rnalll'uvering or the
superpowers in dealing with Vil'l.n<lrn during t.he war
(Lawson 1HH4, 6).
China shifh'd in its filreign
policy from pro-Soviet in the I !HjOs to pro-American
in t.he t H7()s (llarding I !IH4, 21 (j). One must look
at what happened to China during tlwse two
decades to see what. caused t.he dHlngc, and what.
implications this had fClI' Vil'tnam.
Two m~~jOl' events during t.he I !I(j()s involving the
Unit.ed Stutes and the Soviet Union caused China's
immediate interest.s to deviate rrom those or
Vietnam.
First, the war in Vil'tnam seemed to
weaken the U.S. in both domestic' and international
arenas (Smit.h I HH5, H-H>. While Vietnam was very
pleased by a weakened United States, China began
to fear that wit.hout a powl'rrul U.S. the Soviets
would become Ino strong.
While the United States sl'l'med to be losing
sleam in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was reassert.ing
itself as a powerful roree in Eastern I~urope.
In
I H(jH, the Soviet.s invaded CZl'choslovakia to stop a
nl'W government t.hat was seeking Communist
refcJnns.
Wit.h t.his invasion, China bl'came even
more fem-ful or the Soviets. Ilowever, Vietnam was
impl"l~ssed by this display of Soviet strengt.h.
Sino- U.S.

Rapprochement.

A furt.her analysis shows thest' incident.s to be
some
or
the
beginnings
tAl
Sino-American
rapprodwmenl. In I !HjH, President .'ohnson admit.ted
failure in Vietnam (llarding I HH4, 125).
The
United
States appeared
to have lost some
international power in relation to the Soviet Union.
,(,herefcn'e, China had t.o realign itself with the
U.S. in order to achil've a mOl"(' secure balam'e of
power internation:.tlly (Lawson I !'H4, 5). lIarding
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describes China's change in this way:
As we have !{('en, the PRC's position in the
ongoing Cold War between Moscow and Washingt~m
has heen detennined by China's
assessment of the shirt.ing international balance
or power, as well as by the sfleeilie policies
which the two superpOWt~rs have adopted
towUl'ds Peking (l1:mling IB84, 2It;).
China shifted from the Soviet Union to the United
States because the U.S. lost flower, amI the
USSR became the major threat t~1 Chinese security
(Harding 1US:J, 1:1; Ilamrin 1mtl, 210).
China
sought rappl'Oehement with the United States so that
a powerful bloc would be established to oppose the
Soviet Union.
Without opposition fmm the Unit~~d States, China
was admiUed into the United Nations as a third
world power and permanent member of t.he Securit.y
198:1,
) 5).
Following t.his
Co.uncil· (llarding
recognition, China joined with t.he U.S. to sllpport
the
Association
or Southeast
Asian
Nations
(ASI~AN).
This was a big step for China because
previously till' PRC had heen a supporter of
Communist "evolution in Southeast Asia, not of
world peace (llorn 1!J78· 7!l, 585).
Clearly Sino-American rapprochement had a nu~jor
impact on Viel.lullll. The Unit.ed St.at.es was a longstanding enemy t~1 the Vidnamesl', alld IlOW their
Chinese eomrades Wl're aelivdy courting the
U.S. Vil'tnam was stunned by increasing diplomatic
rdati()l~s lwtween the
United Statl's and China.
quasi-alliann~s were then formed hl'lwl'l'lI (:hin:1 and
the Unit.(.·d Stat.es, and Vietnam and the Sovid
Union (110m 1!J7S-7!1, 5l10). As the Chilll'St' moved
towards wanner rl'iations wit.h the United Stales,
they be(~:une more indiffl'rent. 10 Vil'lllallll'Se desires
(narver I lIM I, 4ti:n.
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Anti-llegeJnony (:ampaign
Aller
China
had
taken
moves
towards
rapprochement with I he llnitl'd States,. it t.ook
another sharp turn in foreign policy.
In I !t7:1,
China Legan an ant.i-hegemony campaign (Yao H)SO,
tj:~).
Now
China
wanted
to
mat.eh
the
USSR against the u.S. in a power play-off (Yan
I H80, 50). China at lempt.ed to rhetorically .-eject
Loth the superpowers in order to be a champion for
Third World nations.
This change in Chinese
filreign policy was in part. due to it.s admiltunce intH
the United Nations, whieh Lrought. renewed world
power and independence.
Deng Xiuoping also gave a speech in front of the
United Nutions in 1\)7 ,j which was entitled "The
Three Worlds" (Harding 198:1, (j). In this speech
he described the Fin;t World made up of the
U.S. and the USSR, t.he Second World made up of
Europe, Canada, and .Japan, and the Third World
made up of China, South America, Southeast Asia,
and other developing nations (Yao I !tSO, 5ti).
China's move to oppose the world powers was
critical in communicat.ing it.s desire fur independence
and non-expansion in Southeast Asia (Wang 1977,
I :18). However, China was clearly pointing t'(l the
Soviet Union as the principal threat, and not the
United States. The Unit.ed Stat.es even signed an
agreement with China in I un (the Shanghai
Communique) that hegemony should Le sUlpped. As
evidence of China's ,decision to oppose hegemony, it
decreased its military spending, and the People's
LibeJ'al.ion A,'my lost major political influence (Mart.in
IH77, I~),
In orde,' to see the ,'esult of China's antihegemony campaign, it is necessary to look at t.he
conflict of interest. it created wit.h Vietnam.
By
.Janual'y of I ~17:I, tlw United Stales had cOllduded
negotiations wilh Vietllam to (,lid Ihe war, but. China

COMRADES IN ARMS
had been pushing tH maintain a divided Vielnam
(ltoss I HHH, 24).
China, in its anti-hegemony
campaign, pushed for peace and concessions on
behalf of Vietnam.
Vietnam, on the other hand,
wanted a big victory over a unified country, the
United Slates, and mOl'e power in Southeast Asia.
As a result, the end of the war exacerbated SinoVietnamese tensions.
Vielnam tAlok revenge on these tactics of Chinese
foreign policy by siding with the Soviet Union
(Nguyen, 1H7H, )()fi I).
Vietnam wuld play the
same game that China had started wilh the United
States by increasing ils loyalt.y to the opposing
superpower.
When a frightened China countered
with ils ant.i-hegemony campaign, Vietnam t.limed
even more strongly towards Soviet support. The
Soviet Union was able to offer Vietnam economic
assistance, military aid, diplomatic support, and
ideological unity (Horn W78-7H, 587).
Postwar Events
From Ul7:1 t~1 IH75 Vietnam pushed to unite
North and Sout.h Vietnam, and to increase it.s
mililary power. This was countered by the Chinese
surge for peace and neulral relat.ions t.owards the
United States. China's indifference ulwanb Vietnam's goal lo end the war was a result of t.he
Sino-Amel'ican talks which had taken place only a
few years earlier.
I n summary, during the linal
years of the war, China ahandoned Vietnam: lirst,
when -China moved towards the United St.ates in
1!l70, and second when it leaned away frolll t.he
Soviets with its ani i-lll'gelOony ('lllnpaign,
The events which divided China and Vietnam
before the end of the war were t.he caUSl' of t.he
major ronllids hel weell Ihe two nations al'll~r I Wl5
(tim'ver I !)H I, 41).1).
I{elat.ions had IIl'en faltering
t.hroughout. I he Vil'lllalll cOlll1id, hut wlll'll t he war
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ended there was nothing holding Iht' t.wo cOllntril'S
t.ogethe,· (Lawson I !HH, ;I();n. Tht'y were free to
face each other in open hostility.
The first. sOll/'ce of conHict hetween China and
Vic/nam fill/owing t.he Vietnam w:t/· was Indochina.
110 Chi Minh had not want.ed China t,o intervene
in Soul/wast Asia for fear or fut.ure l~lmfnHlt.ations
(Tai H)65, 4:J I). Arter his deat.h in HUH), Indochina
was an even greater prublem than Ho Chi Minh
had imagined.
Following the war, the power
vacuum created by American withdrawal paved the
way for Vietnamese dominance in Indochina (Yen
I HRO, 12).
Vietnam was also very confident
because of its
victory over another foreign
impel·ialist.
This confidence, among otlll~r things,
gave Vietnam several advantages in the quest ror
Indochina (Harding I !tR4, I I n). Also, with finandal
and diplomatic backing from the Soviet Union,
Vietnam was in a powerful position to overthrow the
established governments in Cambodia and Laos
(Martin I !t77, (4).
China had two demands of Vietnam in the mid
1!17()s: not to closely ally with the Soviet Union,
and not t.o seek domination in Indochina (Hoss I HRH,
4).
Vietnam rrust.rated China hy violating both of
these demands.
China had moved closer to the
United States during t.he war, but now that lhe
U.S. was out of Sout.heast. Asia, China had no
foreign
assistancl'.
China's gn·at.l'st. fear
in
Indochina was that. the Soviet Union and Vietnam
would gain cont./'OI, leaving China sandwit'llCd
between two host.ile regions ("'it.zgerald I !l77, (;7).
IIostilit.y grew betwecn China and Vietnam whcn
Vietnam joined the Council of Mut.ual I';('onomie
Assistance
(COMECON)
III
l!l7H
(Lawson
I !lR4, :J 1 I).
This organii'.at.ion, filllllded in 1!l1 !l,
was comprised of t.he USSR, and IllOSt. ot.her I';ast.cl'll
IIowcvcr, China was never a
Bloc countries.
membcr. By t.his movc, Vietnam displaycd all evcn
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greater commitment to the Soviels.
Despite Chinese backing, in I ~)7:1 1'01 Pot fell to
Comlllullist .iUTCS ill Camlmdia, and thc Palhcl Lao
were vidorious in I,aos.
This Soviet-supported
Vicl.namese domination in Indochina was the crucial
fact~)r
which presaged the armed confrontation
llCtween China and Vietnam ill Feuruary, I ~)7!1
(Lawson IHH4, :ll I).
The final ulow to Sino- Vil'lnunwsc relations was
a pcace tn.~aty signed by Vietnam and t.hc Soviet
Union in Novemher of 1!17H. Technically this was
a Treaty of Friendship allli Coopcration bel ween the
Soviets and t.he VietlHllTlese for the next twcnty-fivc
years (Buszynski I !lHO, H:17).
This move by
Vietnam was perhaps the straw that bl'Oke China's
back with regards· to Soviet- Vietnamese relations.
China could not. risk a l:onspiracy between t.wo
bordering countries.
lIanoi's actions during the lat.e I !17()s encouraged
an already hostile China t.o finally altack in I ~7n
(Ross t nBB, I nn).
It. is clear that Vietnamese
.·elations wilh the Soviet Union were t.he provoking
fador of t.he invasion, despit.e China's claim lhat it.
was simply a· border dispute (Lawson I!lH4, :W:l;
Ross I UBB, 4). China and Vietnam had shared a
border for many years, bUl never had it. caused
such a sc.-ious problem.
This was because t.he
Soviet Union had neve.· been such a t.hreat. t.o
Chinese security. The a lIiam'l' bet.ween Vielnam and
lhe Soviet Union, which hecame even st.l'Ongl'r aftcr
the Vietnam War, was thl' most t.hreat.cning thing
I t. was this
China faced in I IlL' late I !17()s.
t.hat.
evcnt.ually
t.riggered
armed
developr~ent
confrontation in I !l7!'.
A significant conclusion may be drawn from what
has been p.·esenled in I his papl'r. M ueh has hel'n
said as 10 t.he directions bolh China and Vietnam
have I.aken in responst' to U.S. and lISSH rO!"l'ign
policy. The anSWl'r to till' qlle~tion as to why China
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alld Viet nam based t.heir foreign policies on
superpower politics is simply that China and
Vietnam were bollt trying to protect their own
sovereignt.y and security the best way t.hey could.
This would account. for t.he shift China m~HJe to the
U.S. during the early 1WlOs, and the shift of
Viet.nam to the Soviet Union aHer the war.
China felt t.ha/. it could not wi" a wal· against
the Soviet Union and Vietnam (Hoss I !mR, 2IW).
Therefilre, Chinese policy t~)ward Vietnam was based
on eliminating Soviet influence and improving
diplomatic relations with the United States (Ross
1988, 0).
The Chinese would have been able Ul
take a different stand towards Vietnam had the
Soviels not posed such a great threat.
Mao was able to sum up Chinese fill·cign policy
in three maxims: identify the primary threat, avoid
confnHltation wit.h t.he supeqlOwers, and lean toward
the less threatening superpower (llat·ding IOR4, 148).
According Ul this world view, China shifted from the
USSR to the U.S. in response I~l the shifl in the
balance of powe,· (Martin H177, ~W; Lawson 1084,
()

.

Vietnam, on the ot.her hand, had a very different
perspt'dive. Vietnam is a small nat.ion that wanted
to throw off imperialism, and successfully accomplish
a Communist takeover.
Vietnam initially needed
Chinese and Soviet military aid, but after t,he
Chinese sided with Ihe Americans it had a grcatel·
incentive t.o build stronger ties with the Soviet Union
(Smyser 1!IRO, ~). lIistorically, Vietnam was abo
defensive about Chinese domination -- a natural
response when you are the Iwighl)()r of a large
I'egional (lower such as China.

CONCLUSIONS
What may be learned frolll t his analysis of SinoVietn,urwse relations between I !H!) a 1111 I !)7!) is that

I
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the inlernational arena states have "fair weather
friends."
Allies and enemies are continuously
shifting in order to maintain a secure balance of
power (II amrin 1!)H:l, ~()!)). Kenneth Waltz says in
his book about inlernational relations that states
form balances of power whether they wish to or' not
(Waltz 1H7H, 125). Sino-Vietnamese relations are
just another example of stales seeking to maintain
their positions in the inlernational system.
Also, the fact that the international world is
governed by anarchy means that the primary focus
of all stales is t:iecurity (Waltz 1!l7!l, 12(j). At:i a
result,
often
times
mililmoy
clashes
are
manifestations of the scramble of particular nations
for security in the inlernational world (Harding
III

1H83, fi).

It is somewhat diflicult to predict what would
have happened to Sino- Vielnamese relationt:i from
1949 to 197H had lhe superpowers not been so
involved in Southeast Asian affairs. 1I0wever, what
may be seen clearly is that the superpowers played
a major role in Sino-Vietnamese hOt:itility during the
lalter part of the 1H70s.

CURRENT EVENTS
Within the past several months the t:iiluation has
changed in Southeat:it Asia.
China and Vietnam
have made an ertCwt to resolve diflcrences and sign
a peace agreement in Cambodia.
What. is highly
signilicant is t.he fact t.hat China and Vietnam have
made t:hese moves wit.hout major intervention from
the superpowers. The United States and the Sovicl
Union have finally pulled out of Southeast Asia in
order to allow tlwt:ie Asian neighbors the freedom t.o
govern t.hemselves.
As a result, the press is
claiming that. the prm;peds for peace in Sout.heast
At:iia have never beel! bdt.er.
According to the tllesis of tllis paper, the
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superpowers wt're olle 01' tile major faclors in
provoking hostility and unrest between China and
Vietnam.
Now it seelns t.hat China and Viet.nam
are enjoying wanner relations due t~) t.he absence 01'
superpower fi,,'ces. It would seem to hold true then
that. the superpowers did play a signifkaflt role in
Sino- Viet.namese relations during t.he second hall' 01'
the t.wentieth century. They cont.inue to afred the
outcome 01' Asian relations.
However. this time
their impact. is I'rom a spectator position. Perhaps
I't'lat ions in Sout.heast. Asia will quiet down !lOW that
the superpowers have Lurned their attention to other
things.
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